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LABOR LAW, THE LEFT,
AND THE LURE OF THE MARKET
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL *
I'm not an economist, but sometimes I play one in the classroom.
Case in point, for many years I began my Labor Law course with a sec-
tion on labor economics and invariably introduced the material to the
class with a Q&A along the following lines:
How many of you have ever looked for a job?
With the rarest of exceptions, every hand in the room would go up, and
so I would proceed to ask about their job-seeking strategies, to what ex-
tent they succeeded, how long they took etc. In response, students de-
scribed a variety of techniques, from resume spamming to knocking on
doors to networking to calling in family ties. But no matter how desper-
ate and difficult the reported search, over the years no one ever admit-
ted to using the technique suggested by the question I always kept in
waiting:
Did anyone ever try to land a job by offering to work for less
than the employer's current employees?
Indeed, the query would typically prompt either stony silence or a ripple
of nervous laughter, making my scripted follow-up irresistible:
Why not? Isn't that how markets work?
You can imagine the discussion that would ensue once they realized
I was serious, as they would struggle to "explain the obvious" in the face
of my increasingly skeptical replies: "I don't think it would send the
right message to the employer about my skills and talents!" Good point,
you wouldn't want a potential employer to think that hiring you might
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut; Visiting Professor, Yale Law School.
Many thanks to Paul Secunda for organizing the symposium and inviting me to take part; to
Ken Dau-Schmidt whose intriguing essay has provided the rest of us with a marvelous point
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help save labor costs. "I thought my work was worth at least as much as
the employer was paying his incumbent workforce." If that were true,
then why were they working while you were out looking? "That strategy
might get me in the door, but I'd worry that once I started I'd be bitter
about the pay and that might negatively affect my performance." How
does the lack of work altogether make you feel? "If I had a job, I
wouldn't want someone else to use that strategy to displace me." But
would you really rather remain jobless just to honor the Golden Rule?
And so on.
The point of the extended Q&A, of course, was to frame the discus-
sion of the labor economics materials we were about to explore: Labor
markets just don't seem to work the way other markets do, and we-
meaning the very human participants in those errant markets-are the
reason that's the case. When I was on top of my game, I would keep
careful track of the student responses and tease out what each might re-
veal about why it is that labor markets don't follow the supposed rules
of supply and demand. Widgets don't worry about the "signaling" ef-
fects of their price, though people do; widgets don't experience dignitary
or material harms when their price goes down, but people might; widg-
ets don't care when fellow widgets draw a higher price, but people care a
lot; if the price of widgets rises fewer will be sold, but an increase in the
price of people may have the opposite effect; widgets don't turn in a bet-
ter performance if they are sold at higher prices, but-oddly enough -
people may; and so on.
You could write a book about the many ways in which widget mar-
kets and labor markets differ, and Robert Solow did just that two dec-
ades ago, when his Royer lectures at Berkeley were published in The
Labor Market as a Social Institution.' Solow's principal theme is the im-
perial quality of price theory-the tenacious grip of what he refers to as
"textbook economics" on the ways those in his field think and how it
forces them to struggle mightily with longstanding but seemingly
anomalous facts about labor markets, most notably the persistence of
unemployment and the "sticky" quality of wage rates. Widgets would
know exactly what to do if their current price left them lingering in the
stockroom, but people-and sometimes very large numbers of people-
can sit on the shelves a long time before any downward pressure on
wages makes itself felt.
Perhaps people aren't as smart as widgets, or-as Solow argues-
perhaps they have more complex desiderata than those imagined in the
1. ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION (1990).
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textbooks. (As he wryly observes, "Persistent unemployment has been
a persistent problem for economic theory. It is obviously a problem for
the persistently unemployed."') Solow's basic argument is that social
norms-foremost among them notions of fairness and reciprocity-do a
better job of explaining such inconvenient facts than do the profession's
inveterate efforts "to find a believable story that can account for the
facts with minimal damage to the structure of economic theory."3
Though I've always suspected that Solow's insights might have some
purchase beyond the labor market setting-that there might be other
markets that involve, well, people and can likewise be better understood
if the social dimension is included in the calculus-price theory is a
powerful analytical tool that accounts for a wide variety of phenomena.
Economists in its thrall may thus feel they have good reason to be skep-
tical of claims, whatever the evidence and in whatever the setting, that
"the rules are different here."
Indeed, the resilience of orthodoxy continues to this day as those at-
tempting to force the square peg of labor into the round hole of price
theory struggle mightily to explain away empirical studies suggesting
that an increase in the minimum wage may actually be associated with
an increase in employment levels rather than the decline so confidently
predicted by textbook economics. Most recently, they have taken up
the cudgels for the New Personnel Economics (NPE), which endeavors
to explain the workings of those pesky internal labor markets from an
optimization and efficiency perspective-i.e., firms are on a relentless
search for the most efficient personnel practices and those failing. to
identify and adopt them pay the price in the competitive market.! Play.-
ing the role of Robert Solow are Paul Osterman and others who (here
we go again) marshal a great deal of ethnographic and comparative evi-
dence that is difficult to square with NPE (for example, the agonizingly
slow diffusion of high-performance work systems and the considerable
variety of personnel practices among similar and similarly successful
firms) and argue once again that labor markets can be better understood
as social institutions, where power relationships, hierarchies, politics,
cultural and national diversity, intra- and inter-group dynamics and the
2. Id. at 28.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., TITO BOERI & JAN VAN OURS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECr LABOR
MARKETS 33, 38-44 (2008). In particular, see the discussion of the now-famous work on min-
imum-wage effects by David Card and Alan Krueger. Id. at 4043.
5. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, Personnel Economics: The Econo-
mist's View of Human Resources, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2007).
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like fairly overwhelm simplistic economic modeling.' But this New Insti-
tutional Labor Economics-itself an effort to revive an older tradition
on which Solow drew heavily for his lectures-still finds itself struggling
for purchase among those under the spell of price theory and resistant to
considerable evidence that it just doesn't account very well for a large
and central arena of human endeavor.
There is, naturally enough, a "third way"-the work associated with
behavioral economics that likewise critiques the orthodox view in favor
of ferreting out all manner of market "imperfections" that arise as a re-
sult of the fact that it's human beings rather than robots whose endeav-
ors and interactions are at stake. Thus, a plethora of empirical studies
confirms that people are not nearly as rational, as steadfast, or as mon-
omaniacally self-interested as the imagined participants in idealized
markets: their "[a]ctual judgments show systematic departures from
models of unbiased forecasts"; their "actual decisions often violate the
axioms of expected utility theory"; they "often take actions that they
know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests"; and they
"care, or act as if they care, about others" and are, as a result, "both nic-
er and (when they are not treated fairly) more spiteful than the agents
postulated by neoclassical theory."'
One might be forgiven for thinking that such work simply "proves
the obvious" about the human condition, but-judging from some of the
reactions it has sparked-it is the adherents of neoclassical economics
and not the behavioralist critics who are working with straw men. In-
deed, I greatly admire the thoughtful scholarship associated with the
behavioral approach, and it has provided the basis for important insights
as well as promising policy analyses across a variety of settings. But
when it comes to the world of work, I have the nagging sense that it
reads the way I would have expected astronomy literature to read just
before someone finally figured out that the earth was revolving around
the sun rather than vice versa: There's so much explaining to do, so
many things that don't quite make sense, so many places where the pre-
dictions and the data seem to be at odds, that you can't help but wonder
whether there's a point at which those involved might finally begin to
consider the possibility that there's a problem with the underlying model
itself. (Enter Solow and Osterman, again and again and again.)
6. See, e.g., Paul Osterman, The Contours of Institutional Labour Economics: Notes To-
ward a Revived Discipline, 7 Socio-ECON. REV. 695 (2009).
7. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-79 (1998).
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But if it's easy to see why folks trained in hammer deployment might
have a tendency to see nails wherever they look, what I found myself
thinking as I read my way through the essay that brings us together for
this symposium is why labor law professors and especially those of a
progressive bent might succumb to the same temptation. Since when
has "address[ing] labor market failures"-in Professor Dau-Schmidt's
phrasing, responding to the familiar market "imperfections" of "imper-
fect information, transaction costs, and public goods" 8-become our
calling's most important and promising argumentative strategy?
To be sure, I am in ready agreement with Dau-Schmidt that the US
would be much the better for a genuine labor voice in both corporate
and workplace governance, and in principle I would happily sign on to
all of his specific law-reform proposals, including some version of co-
determination (i.e., worker representation on corporate boards)' and his
detailed agenda for labor law reform:
1. institute a system of moderate but mandatory severance pay for
discharges without good cause and a requirement of reasonable
notice for unilateral changes in con act terms (let's call these the
"employment security" proposals);'
2. require or encourage an Americanized version of European
works councils while relaxing § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA)-the provision originally designed to outlaw
company unions-in order to permit employer-sponsored em-
ployee representation plans, subject to enforceable guarantees of
independence and representativeness (the "non-union employee
representation" proposals);"
3. enact the Employee Free Choice Act, including card check (ena-
bling unions to avoid the cumbersome and employer-friendly
election procedures of the NLRA); mandatory first-contract arbi-
tration (since labor's bargaining power is severely curtailed under
current law by the employer's right to permanently replace strik-
ing workers and by the limitations of secondary boycott law); and
8. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A
Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 804 (2011); see also id at 781-82.
9. Id. at 824-26.
10. Id. at 827.
11. Id. at 827-28
9512011]
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enhanced injunctive and monetary remedies for employer unfair
labor practices (such as firing union organizers) that match the
remedies available to employers against unions (the "EFCA"
proposals);"
4. authorize union solicitation by "outside" organizers under the
same rules that govern solicitation by fellow employees (in es-
sence, reasonable access in non-working areas during lunch and
work breaks); provide incumbent employees with access to low-
cost employer owned communications systems (e.g., email) for
organizing activities; and guarantee a right of equal access for un-
ions and their supporters when an employer campaigns against
union representation and/or opens its property to other forms of
solicitation (the "access" proposals);"
5. relax the doctrine of exclusive representation to require employ-
ers to bargain with unions representing less than a majority of
employees, whether or not there is a majority union already in
place (the "minority union" proposal)."
Though I'd be eager to see the details, in principle you can sign me
up for each and every one of these. But I worry that there is a discon-
nect between this ambitious legislative agenda and Dau-Schmidt's larger
goal of providing enhanced employee voice in American worklife and
that this disconnect may undermine any asserted "appeal to employers"
making the agenda "politically feasible" in the current climate."
For one thing, only two of the proposals-i.e., codetermination (on
the corporate governance side) and the works council-style and employ-
er-sponsored representation plans (on the workplace governance
side)-directly address the question of employee voice in the contempo-
rary workplace. To be sure, employees with legally protected job securi-
ty are a lot more likely to speak up than those who are employed at will,
and unions strengthened by EFCA, enhanced access, and the right to
represent less than a majority of a firm's employees would certainly
provide more employee voice than is available under current law. But
the latter proposals raise a multitude of non-voice issues that-to em-
ployers and their many friends in Copgress anyway-are likely to pro-
vide reasons for strenuous opposition to enactment without regard to
12. Id. at 828-29.
13. Id. at 829-30.
14. Id. at 830-31.
15. Id. at 769.
[94:947952
THE LURE OF THE MARKET
the merits of the voice issue. To put it another way, they might not want
to buy the dog no matter how they feel about the tail.
Perhaps more striking, there is a notable absence of proposals de-
signed to provide employee voice in the context of today's workplace,
where outsourcing to labor contractors and supply chains is increasingly
common and presents some of the most daunting challenges for con-
temporary workplace regulation, whatever its aim." You can provide
the employees of a cleaning services firm or an auto parts supplier with
all the voice in the world vis-A-vis their proximate employers, but if the
policies and practices of a user firm are a principal source of their dis-
content-or, for that matter, if the user firm would prefer not to deal
with contractors or suppliers that promote employee voice, with or
without union representation-then it's not clear how much good those
rights would do them. Developing plausible and creative ways to en-
force the promise of labor law in the context of this brave new world of
outsourced work is going to have to be an essential dimension of any ef-
fort to enlarge employee voice going forward.
I worry too that the lack of fit between the stated goal of "promoting
employee voice" and the specific proposals on the table risks making the
effort here look like a post hoc rationalization for organized labor's leg-
islative wish-list from the past two decades rather than the fresh view
from a new perspective that Dau-Schmidt intends. Indeed, with the ex-
ception of the card check provision of EFCA-and more about that in a
moment-these proposals have been around in various forms for a long
time and the chances for enactment may not have improved with age.
Something very much like the employment security proposal was of-
fered by Paul Weiler two decades ago in Governing the Workplace,
when the anti-"at will" movement seemed to have legs and a modified
Montana approach-i.e., a mandatory "just cause" rule for private em-
ployment enforced by a modest administrative compensation scheme for
wrongful discharges-seemed a plausible goal." But for a host of rea-
sons, the anti-"at will" movement lost its legs and indeed is arguably on
the verge of being unceremoniously interred by the curiously retro pro-
visions of the ALI's Restatement of Employment."'
16. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010) (analyzing strategies for enforcing minimum wage
laws against user firms of outsourced labor).
17. PAUL C. WEILER, GOvERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 94-104 (1990).
18. See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Re-
statement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
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The non-union representation proposals were under active consider-
ation at the dawn of the Clinton Administration, which produced the
Dunlop Report but got nowhere against an onslaught of argument that
works councils and other forms of non-union employee representation
were (a) Euro-socialistic and (b) merely a foothold for union organiza-
tion. Sad to say, there is little reason to think the current polity would
be more receptive-especially if the package includes provisions (such
as the access proposals) that are clearly and unapologetically designed
to do exactly what the earlier opponents feared, i.e., gain a more secure
foothold for union organizing.
As for card check-the one relative newcomer to the list-its pro-
spects looked surprisingly promising as recently as two years ago, with
the newly elected President and majorities in both houses of Congress
voicing support. But the moment passed, the bill didn't, and the pro-
spects for enactment in anything like the current political climate are
vanishingly small.
On the good news side, it would not surprise me to see some or all of
the access and minority union proposals emerge as law from the Obama
NLRB, a reminder-in even our darkest moments, when we worry that
Ralph Nader might be right after all-that the choice between the two
major parties does matter, and matter a lot, to some fairly important
things in the world of law.'9 Such changes would likely be protected for
the next while by presidential veto-and by the fact that even a Tea Par-
ty Congress is not likely to de-fund the NLRB once they figure out that
§H 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) are part of the NLRA, though it is great fun to
imagine a world in which they took their minimalist government rheto-
ric seriously and decided to let both secondary boycotts and recogni-
tional picketing out of the box. At all events, accomplishments via
NLRB decisions, to whatever extent they materialize, are highly likely
in even the medium term to become part of the ping-pong law that suc-
cessive Republican and Democratic Boards reverse and reverse again as
majorities shift with election returns, not a particularly promising plat-
POL'Y J. 93 (2009) (critiquing job security provisions of the proposed restatement of private-
sector employment law for embracing a far more robust version of the employment-at-will
rule than is justified by the case law).
19. Indeed, between the time I originally prepared these remarks and their submission
for publication, the newly constituted NLRB issued a decision suggesting likely support for
reviving the long-time agency position-recently called into question by a Bush Board deci-
sion and several courts of appeals-that a firm can't ban union solicitation efforts by non-
employee organizers if it opens its property to other forms of solicitation. See Roundy's Inc.,
356 N.L.R.B., slip op. No. 27, at 6 (Nov. 12,2010).
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form from which to herald a new era of employee voice.
If the prospects for enactment have not improved with time, might
they improve with an effort to promote them as a package reconfigured
in the name of employee voice? Dau-Schmidt makes a promising move
on this front by tying together issues of corporate and workplace gov-
ernance, and there's a lot to like in the notion of promoting a worker-
shareholder alliance to monitor managerial overreaching and a worker-
management alliance to resist the predations of capital markets ob-
sessed with short-term gains. Indeed, the consequences of the latter are
the stuff of media attention and popular culture, and a broad-scale gov-
ernance reform effort featuring a common theme of "look, Ma, no em-
ployee voice" offers intriguing possibilities for strategic linkage. But-
as the opening section of my essay suggests-I'm less convinced by the
idea of pitching worker voice as a remedy for "market failures and im-
perfections," a central argument in the paper presented here.
The basic idea, I gather, is that the employers to whom Dau-Schmidt
wishes to appeal-together with their supporters in public officialdom
and policy circles-believe in the virtues of competitive markets and
oppose most regulatory interventions on the basis of those beliefs.
Thus, if we are able to convince this audience that imperfections and
failures are undermining the operation of the labor market, then we
have strengthened the case for an intervention designed to set things
right.
On reflection, I guess I'm not surprised that those of us trained as
lawyers might find this a compelling rhetorical strategy since it's the one
we use all the time with judges: Your Honor, you may &ink you oppose
X result but in fact you are compelled by your acceptance of principle or
rule or case Y to accept it. Judges speak in the language of logical en-
tailment and so they always say they are reaching X result-no matter
how distasteful they may find it "personally" or how certain they would
be to vote against it "if I were a Member of Congress"-because princi-
ple or rule or case Y compels it and is already the law. Entire forests
have been sacrificed in the debate over whether and to what extent what
judges say they are doing and what they are actually doing are one and
the same, but there is little reason to assume that employers or their




Simply put, I think employers-and their organizational and elected
representatives-are far more likely to base their reaction to a particular
law reform agenda on whether they think that agenda will serve their
material interests than on whether its constituent proposals are some-
how entailed by the grander principles they are perfectly willing to cast
aside when need be. Thus, I seriously doubt we're ever going to con-
vince most American employers that enhancing employee voice-let
alone enhancing it through the mechanism of union representation-will
be good for them. Indeed, they'll be right about their self-interest in an
important way, because whatever the virtues of union representation in
connection with the holy trinity of "imperfect information, transaction
costs, and the provision of public goods," the fact remains that the union
wage effect derives in no small measure from a reduction in firm profit-
ability (there goes that worker-shareholder alliance) and that the un-
ion's role in workplace governance necessarily means a reduction in the
power and discretion of those running the day-to-day operations of the
firm (and there goes that worker-management alliance).
So why do we persist in pursuing such argumentative strategies? I
don't doubt for a moment that Dau-Schmidt and others in our field do
so because they hope and believe those strategies may work, and-
particularly with the imprimatur of a highly and rightly respected labor
law scholar-perhaps they will indeed find some purchase in American
policy discourse. I have much the same reaction to Kathy Stone's ingen-
ious effort to hold employers to their part of the "new psychological
contract," accepting "the boundaryless workplace" (i.e., the decline of
long-term employment) as a given but arguing that employers should
make good on promises of training and mobility deployed to persuade
their workers that there is life after job security.' And maybe we can
convince employers that their professed commitment to market order-
ing requires them to accept a greater measure of employee voice or that
their professed commitment to boundarylessness requires them to pro-
vide their workers with greater skills-development and networking op-
portunities-or, in the latter case, at the very least to stop enforcing all
those decidedly demobilizing non-compete agreements. But once again
I am dubious about the efficacy of such strategies and worry that those
we would persuade will gladly accept our apparent embrace of their ide-
as (like the primacy of market ordering or the inevitability of boundary-
lessness) while rejecting the reform proposals offered in their name
20. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 127-56 (2004).
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without the slightest trace of irony-a devil's bargain, to be sure, only
without any hint of a quid pro quo.
I worry all the more that in making these arguments we are reinforc-
ing ideas we should be challenging and that we are seducing ourselves
rather more than we are our intended audience. Market talk has to a
remarkable degree become a lingua franca of the contemporary legal
academy, and it's increasingly easy to believe that law reform proposals
just won't be taken seriously by serious people unless they can be de-
fended in the rhetoric of economic analysis, as if we must genuflect at
the altar of competitive markets before we may petition for the redress
of grievances born of all too human failures and imperfections.
Indeed, I see a powerful intuitive appeal to such arguments born of
our training and habits of mind as legal professionals. In a nutshell,
their economic cast gives them an apparent rigor we can no longer de-
rive from either doctrinal analysis (after the indeterminacy critique) or
normative engagement (after the decline of grand narratives), and rig-
orous entailment (rather than contestable choice) is the holy grail of le-
gal argument. Moreover, there is a deep and abiding resonance be-
tween contemporary legal consciousness (i.e., an understanding of the
legal universe framed by an atomistic common law of contract, tort, and
property where statutory interventions are exceptionalized) and eco-
nomic thinking (a world of perfect markets where interventions are jus-
tified by particular market failures)-a resonance that may explain the
appeal of the latter to those of us who have drunk the water of the for-
mer, a link I am exploring at greater length in a work-in-progress.2' And
finally there is the transgressive thrill of using "the master's tools"
against him--of "flipping" the usual entailments of economic orthodoxy
and proving again and again that a commitment to market ordering en-
tails this or that progressive intervention.
Now I may well be succumbing here to some habits of thinking of
my own, in this case those born of a pre-Vatican II Catholic upbringing:
Anything anywhere near as fun as economic analysis-particularly in
the service of counter-intuitive ends like promoting worker voice-
simply must be a sin. Yet as the Q&A with which the essay began sug-
gests, textbook economics may obscure more than it reveals about the
operation of labor markets. Understanding the workplace and the labor
market as social institutions-and forthrightly pursuing governance re-
form in the name of social values such as democratic and humane order-
21. Richard Michael Fischl, A Common Law for Labor Relations (Redux) (forthcoming
2011).
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ing-seems to me a more promising starting point than casting our lot
with the supposed laws of supply and demand.
